What’s Left of Secularization?

William Edgar

Social scientists are telling a different story today about the role of faith in public life

The most significant shift in the field of sociology of religion over the past forty years is the reassessment of older theories of secularization. Basically, simple secularization theory (sometimes called “the standard model”) claimed that in the West, over a period of several centuries, there was a measurable decline in religious belief and practice. Many sociologists saw the West leading the rest of the world down the same path.

The Standard Model

Stated more carefully, simple secularization theory refers to a historical process whereby religious worldviews, as well as institutions, have lost their power over human lives. Secularization breaks down the older “sacramental view,” whereby this world is governed and given meaning by an other world, usually the supernatural, centered in God. After the breakdown, our visible world emerges as the only significant world. This process was seen to have happened because of the rise of modernity, and was felt most acutely in industrial societies, especially Western and Central Europe since the Renaissance.1

The classic statement on secularization is from Max Weber (1864–1920), who described the “disenchantment of the world” because of rationalization. As he would put it, rather dramatically, the old monastery walls that kept the sacred and the secular distinct have broken down, and now it is predominantly the secular world where everything important in life, including religion, is played out. Both Weber and Émile Durkheim (1858–1917) believed that social differentiation was at the heart of the process. As history unfolds, the church becomes only one competing institution among many others. Further, as humankind grows and matures, it will no longer take refuge in religion but will develop an independent internal autonomy. This autonomy will rule in the plurality of the various secular spheres. Thus, the state, economics, science, the arts, and so on, would be emancipated from the church, and this would lead to the two main consequences of secularization: the decline of religion (its gradual eclipse into irrelevance), and privatization (whereby everything important, including values and religion, becomes strictly personal, not institutional).2

Today, very few sociologists accept the classical secularization thesis stated in such simple terms. What happened over this forty-year period to make them change? The answer is, primarily, new data that came in—phenomena that could not be explained by traditional secularization theory. Additionally, sociology began to develop a clearer understanding of the nature of religion itself as they adjusted their models to the phenomena. The phenomena had been there, but somehow many Western sociologists were blind to them. Let’s consider three examples of scholars who challenged the standard model.

Three Challengers

First is Peter L. Berger, a preeminent sociologist of religion in our times, who reversed his earlier acceptance of secularization theory when he had to face the hard fact that conservative, orthodox movements that have resisted modern secularization are on the rise around the globe. Think of Pentecostalism in Latin America, or of Islam’s resurgence. Why had he not seen this earlier? It is because, he now admits, there was a flaw in his intellectual framework.

At the heart of Berger’s reversal was his realization that two significant phenomena, secularization and pluralization, which he had thought overlapped, are in fact quite distinct. Pluralization means the coexistence in one place of many different worldviews and value systems, and thus a historically unprecedented availability of options and choices. Modernity often leads to pluralization, but, he discovered, it does not necessarily lead to secularization. It may, and it has, in some parts of the world, but modernity is not a simple predictor of secularization.

Modernity often leads to pluralization because of factors like globalization and urbanization, to which we can testify in many world-class cities, including those in China. But Berger points out that pluralism, with its multiplication of choices, does not have to lead to secularization. Indeed, it often leads to specifically religious choices—even fundamentalism—for modernity undermines older certainties and thus movements that promise new certainty have a great chance of success.3

A second example is José Casanova, professor of sociology at the New School for Social Research, who began to write about the failure of the older secularization thesis because it was abundantly clear that religious traditions played crucial roles in the public domain. Theorists had predicted religions were irrelevant, but even the front-page headlines of our newspapers spoke to the contrary. Just think of the Islamic revolution in Iran. Casanova’s thesis is that we are actually witnessing the “deprivatization” of religion in the modern world.4

Much secularization theory postulated that such modernizing factors as the Protestant Reformation, the modern state, capitalism, and modern science, had set in motion a process that would undermine the medieval world and lead to general secularization, with different rates in different countries. But Casanova kept stumbling on data that showed the contrary. He studied the cases of Spain, Poland, Brazil, and both Evangelicalism and Roman Catholicism in the United States, and found that while religion may be declining in Western Europe, in most other places it is a political factor to be reckoned with. His conclusion is that privatization is one option—particularly in the liberal view of what should be public and what should be private—but it is not by any means a required option. In Poland, for example, the church became one of the most powerful and effective forces in resisting the totalitarian state. In Brazil, Christianity has had the effect of galvanizing the poor and defying the “structures of evil” that keeps them down.5

A third example of challenges to traditional secularization theory is from the eminent French sociologist Danièle Hervieu-Léger. She found flaws in the theory by studying the contemporary phenomenon of the sects.6 She confronted the rise of groups and beliefs that were outside of the traditions handed down by the major religions. This includes the many varieties of Asian groups that have come to be popular in the West.7 She notes the disconnect between secularization theory and the proliferation of belief systems that would be considered irrational and bizarre in the Enlightenment model. For example, Krishna-consciousness draws believers who are looking to be absorbed into the divine. They must devote themselves unconditionally to the ashram, which becomes a new society, self-sufficient, more or less a utopia. What appears astonishing in a traditional reading is the attraction of such groups to well-educated modern people.

When she began to study these matters in depth, Hervieu-Léger discovered that modernity itself brings a rate of change that produces instability and doubt among people. In response, they mix and match what they will believe in a highly individualistic way. Some examples include Roman Catholics who believe in reincarnation, Lutherans who accept a pantheistic view of nature, and Jews who practice Buddhist meditation. One of the reasons for this creative religious composition is felt disappointment with the older mainline religions, given their heavy institutional structure and clear doctrines, but whose sense of community or authenticity has been disrupted by modernity.

According to the popular slogan, in Europe people are “believing without belonging.” And there is a large body of symbolic material to choose from. Two out of three French Roman Catholic teenagers will never have attended mass. Yet they will all have seen films like Little Buddha and Witness (describing the Amish of Pennsylvania). So some turn to narrow, doctrinaire sects. Others, though, keep things at a safe distance, thus producing a paradox. Their religious beliefs, she reports, are not quite as diverse as they may first appear. They are standardized along certain lines: a minimum creed of the inner life, of love, of tolerance, and so on. These essentially psychological values are themselves promoted by the modern consumer mentality, so this mix-and-match religion turns out to be narrow in its own way.

Diagnosing Europe

And that brings me to the main question: is simple secularization theory altogether mistaken? Or could it be one narrative in the midst of others?

One of the abiding cases used to argue against desecularization is Europe. Everyone recognizes that Europe is secularized to some extent. For Steve Bruce of the University of Aberdeen, Europe and much of the West really are secularized. Following Weber, Durkheim, and the earlier writings of Berger, Bruce argues that cultural diversity and individualism have placed religion in the margins. From church attendance figures to public discourse, there are so many proofs of true secularization in Europe.8

How is this to be reconciled with the new theories claiming that secularization is not happening? One approach is to take Europe as an exception. A number of sociologists, the majority, recognize that in Europe religion was once firmly and broadly established—say, in Medieval times—but that today it is not. (A few sociologists, such as Rodney Stark, would claim that a careful look at the data shows that there never was a European “golden age” of widely practiced faith.9) Instead, we see several trends that maintain religion, but in different guises.

One is the passage to “vicarious religion”—that is, a smaller, active group performs religious functions on behalf of the greater number. For example, while church attendance is way down, people still participate in certain rites, such as funerals. They also listen to their religious leaders in programs on radio and television.

A second trend is the passage from obligation to consumption. That is, people now go to church by choice, because they see some benefit for themselves, not because they must. Even taking these into account, Europe still does face secularization, in the sense that traditional, institutional religion is declining.

But there is also a third trend: the increasing number of immigrants who are arriving in great numbers into the large European cities. This is linked to decolonization, and to labor, whereby various countries open their doors to foreign workers. Very often these immigrants bring a vibrant religion with them. The most alive Christian churches in various parts of Western Europe tend to be largely West Indian and African. Also, of course, large numbers of Muslims are populating Europe, bringing an interesting dynamic.

Not all countries allow for complete religious freedom, however. France, for example, will not allow children to wear “ostensible” religious garb, and discourages them from developing any group identity. Great Britain is more tolerant. But in general, many European countries are changing their attitudes about religion because of the challenge of these immigrant people. While the former consensus was that religion should be a private matter, now many Europeans are being forced to reevaluate the role of religion and to see it as having a strong public face.

Finally, one can note the rapid growth of New Age religion—or a “holistic milieu,” as it is sometimes known—which encompasses a wide variety of elements. From Asian religions redefined by Westerners, to acceptance of the occult, to holistic medicines, we have here more “believing without belonging.” Some sociologists try to argue that these new religions and religious expressions are actually further proof of secularization, rather than a resurgence. David Voas and Steve Bruce, for example, believe that these newer religions lack vitality, are vague, inauthentic, and will have no social impact to speak of. They point out that many people practice yoga for stress relief, not spiritual enhancement.

I am quite impressed with this argument. In the New Testament, James tells us that true religion must evidence itself in deeds of mercy and seeking justice for the oppressed.10 Overall, however, I am not sure the assessment is convincing. Just because a religion is inward, and possibly vague, does not mean it lacks substance. A move away from the transcendent to the subjective may be regrettable to many of us, but it is not necessarily a move away from religion. Indeed, in the context of a technological and rational world, these new religions may be an important part of re-mythologizing the world.

Definitions and expectations

As we can see, much depends on our definition of religion itself. Here, French sociologist Jacques Ellul (1912–1994) has an important contribution to make. Professor of jurisprudence at the University of Bordeaux, Ellul was one of the first to question the simple secularization theory by asking us to understand better the nature of religion. For example, he responded to Harvard Divinity School’s Harvey Cox, whose landmark 1965 book is entitled The Secular City.11 Cox’s thesis, drawing heavily on Weber, was that history has moved us away from the “wreckage of religious worldviews,” and on to good things like urbanization and scientific advances. This would make mankind altogether more responsible. Cox’s definition of secularization was typical for the times. Following Dutch theologian C. A. Peursen and others, it is “the deliverance of man ‘first from religious and then from metaphysical control over his reason and his language.’”12 Cox goes on to argue that, far from being the enemy of Christian faith, secularization is its friend, and even its child. Jacques Ellul’s powerful answer came in his book, The New Demons.13 His own thesis is based on a conviction about religion itself: secularization is an impossibility because of who we are as human beings.

Ellul instead uses a model of deep structure vs. surface structure. Today in Europe, he posits, while the vocabulary of the religion might change, and will no longer be Christian (from “Christendom”), that change does not mean religion has disappeared. Instead, it simply takes on a new vocabulary. For Ellul, the candidates for a newer religion in the West are science, technology, nation-building, and hedonism. While one could debate his candidates, the idea is clear: We cannot jettison religion because we are intrinsically religious. (In fairness, Harvey Cox later modified his position. He eventually came to celebrate what he calls the “feast of fools,” noting the resurgence of many different religions, including the world-wide charismatic movement, which has special vitality even in the West.)

So, where does this leave us—not only Europe, but the rest of the world? Is there something to secularization theory worth keeping? Yes, no doubt there is. For one thing, properly understood, secularization tells us where the center of gravity has shifted. In Europe, secularization means that religion has moved into a private sphere and into more generalized spirituality. For another, the theory enables us to take a deeper look at social differentiation—the separation of the spheres. It helps us see religion at a deeper level than mere institutional participation or overt power. In a word, secularization is not valuable as prescription, but it is still valuable as description.14

I agree with Jacques Ellul and many other scholars who assume every human being to be religious. The manifestations will be vastly different. In the Western world this may mean a general movement from organized religion to such dangerous things as idolizing the state, or to such relatively benign things as subjective spirituality.15 In this case, we see both decline and growth in religion. Decline, because there is less institutional religion. The phenomenon of pluralization exacerbates distrust of tradition. Also, in countries with strong secular governments, traditional religions are more easily banished into the private sphere. Thus a portion of the standard model still makes some sense. But this sort of decline is in a dialectical relation with the growth of religion, contrary to its more simple formulations.

There really is growth, and religiosity is very much on the rise in many different forms. It is also the case that neither in the West, nor in the global South, has institutional religion expired. To the contrary, it promises to display enormous strength. It will more and more be a force to contend with. Whether in its public, institutional form, or in the more private ways described above, we will do better to recognize the reality of religion. Governments as well as other social spheres, from business, to the arts, to science, to family, should not fear religion, but develop reasonable ways to recognize and incorporate religious convictions into our societies.  

William Edgar is professor of apologetics at Westminster Theological Seminary and a Senior Fellow of the Trinity Forum. This article is adapted from a paper presented at the September 2006 Wuhan Colloquium on secularization at China’s Wuhan University.

Features, Faiths and Worldviews, Public Square, Society, Thu 15 Mar 2007